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a b s t r a c t
For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that
the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to a core
imputation is less than or equal to n(n − 1)/2, where n is the number of players. This
number considerably improves the bounds found by Kóczy (2006) [5] and Yang (2010)
[11]. Our result relies on an altered version of the procedure proposed by Sengupta and
Sengupta (1996) [9]. The use of the Davis–Maschler reduced-games is also pointed out.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The core [3] is the solution concept for transferable utility games in coalitional form (henceforth, simply called a game)
that collects the imputations which cannot be blocked by any coalition of players. As such, it satisfies the internal stability
property. Nevertheless, the core is often criticized on two aspects. First, it does not account for every imputation it excludes,
since it does not always satisfy the external stability property. Second, Harsanyi [4] considers that this solution concept is
too myopic because it neglects the effect of indirect dominance relations.
Harsanyi [4] introduces an indirect dominance relation which enables to overcome these lacks. It relies on a sequence of
imputations inwhich there exists a direct domination between any two consecutive imputations. Sengupta and Sengupta [9]
employ this indirect dominance relation to show that the core is indirectly externally stable: starting from any imputation
that stands outside the core, there always exists a finite chain of blockswhich terminates in the core. This result has initiated
the literature on the accessibility of the core. The central question is then to determine an upper bound on the number of
blocks needed to access the core.
Some recent articles try to grasp this problem as explained in the following, and our article improves on the existing
answers. In Sengupta and Sengupta [4], the core is reached after a bounded number of blocks but this number is not studied.
Kóczy [5] provides the first description of an upper bound, but it is overwhelmingly difficult to compute it and relies on the
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game under consideration. Yang [11] lowers this bound by means of a more restrictive dominance relation, which never
makes the past blocking coalitions worse off. Yang’s construction is very instructive but his new bound is also sensitive to
the game under consideration since it is equal to the number of active coalitions in the game, i.e. those coalitions different
from the grand coalition for which the worth is greater than the sum of the stand-alone worths of its members. Even if this
number can be explicitly computed, it can be exponentially large compared to the number of players.
In this article, we show that the core of any game with n players can be accessed with at most n(n − 1)/2 blocks. This
result gathers many advantages of the above-mentioned literature while it does not bear any of its main drawbacks. First,
it improves dramatically the bound found by Kóczy [5], proving that the required number of blocks is polynomial in the
number of players and not exponential as it was suspected so far. Second, our upper bound is very easy to compute, while
it is not the case in Kóczy [5]. Thirdly, our bound relies solely on the number of players in the game, while the bounds in
Kóczy [5] and Yang [11] vary across games with the same number of players. For instance, the bound found by Yang [11]
fluctuates from 0 to 2n − (n+ 2).
The procedure which is used to prove our result is similar to the one introduced by Sengupta and Sengupta [9]. In
particular, both procedures use a core element as a reference point. Nevertheless, we introduce two major differences.
The first difference is related to the choice, at each step of the procedure, of the blocking coalition. While Sengupta and
Sengupta [9] choose a coalitionwhose excess ismaximalwith respect to the current imputation, we select a coalition among
the smallest coalitions with positive excess. The second difference is related to the way the excess of this chosen coalition is
redistributed. While Sengupta and Sengupta [9] split this excess equally among the players of the chosen blocking coalition
whose payoff is less than their core reference payoff, we try to fill in the gap between their current payoff and their core
reference payoff for as many such players as possible. The aim of these two changes is to give to as many new players as
possible their core reference payoff at each step of the procedure.
Another way to outline our procedure is to use, at each step, the Davis–Maschler reduced-games with respect to the core
reference point and to the current coalition of players who do not get their core reference payoff (Davis and Maschler [2]).
Such reduced-games describe situations in which all the players agree that the left players get their core reference
payoffs but continue to cooperate with the remaining players, subject to the foregoing agreement. The Davis–Maschler
reduced-games are well known for being the corner stone of the so-called reduced-game property. This property states
that if an allocation is prescribed by some solution concept in a game, then the restriction of this allocation to any
coalition of players is also prescribed by the solution concept in the reduced-game associated with these coalition and
allocation.
The literature on the accessibility of the core belongs to a broader literature on the accessibility of cooperative solution
concepts. Yang [12] and Béal et al. [1] prove that the coalition-structure core can be accessed in a quadratic number of
blocks. When the underlying game is cohesive, i.e. when the worth of the grand coalition exceeds the total worth of any
other partition of the players, an implication of these results is that the number of blocks necessary to access the core
is linear in the number of players. However, the procedures in these articles differ from ours on a crucial aspect: the
allocations along the dominance path need not be efficient, which is rather far from the requirements of the usual dominance
relation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definitions and state the main theorem. Section 3
describes our procedure. Section 4 demonstrates two lemmas on which the proof of the main theorem relies, and the
proof of the theorem itself. Section 5 discusses the connection between our result and the Davis–Maschler reduced-
games. Section 6 provides examples in which our procedure is compared to two alternative approaches. Section 7
concludes.
2. Preliminaries and the result
Let ⊆ denote weak set inclusion and ⊂ denote proper set inclusion. We use the notation |S| to denote the number of
elements in a finite set S.
In most of this article, we fix a nonempty and finite player set N = {1, . . . , n}. A (TU)-game on N is a real-valued function
v : 2N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. A nonempty subset S of N is called a coalition and v(S) is interpreted as the worth of S.
An allocation x ∈ Rn on N is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff xi ∈ R to each player i ∈ N . Given an allocation x ∈ Rn
and a coalition S, xS will denote the restriction of x to S and x(S) will stand for

i∈S xi. For two allocations x, y ∈ Rn, we
write xS > yS if xi ≥ yi for each i ∈ S but xS ≠ yS . An allocation x ∈ Rn is efficient if x(N) = v(N) and individually rational
if xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N . An individually rational and efficient allocation is referred to as an imputation and the set of
imputations of v is denoted by I(v).
Let ΓN be the set of all finite games on N . A solution on ΓN is a function F which assigns to each v ∈ ΓN a set of allocations
F(v).
Given an allocation x ∈ Rn, the excess e(x, S) of a coalition S is given by
e(x, S) = v(S)− x(S)
and E(x) stands for the set of coalitions with positive excess with respect to x ∈ Rn.
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The core is the solution C on ΓN that assigns to each game v ∈ ΓN the possibly empty set C(v) of imputations for which
the excess of each coalition is not positive, i.e.
C(v) = x ∈ I(v) : e(x, S) ≤ 0,∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} .
Denote by Γ cN the set of games in ΓN with a nonempty core.
Let x, y ∈ Rn be two imputations. We say that x directly dominates y via coalition S, which we denote by x>S y, if
xS > yS and x(S) ≤ v(S). Following Harsanyi [4], we say that x indirectly dominates y if there exists a finite sequence
of imputations (x0, . . . , xm) and a finite collection of coalitions (S0, . . . , Sm−1) such that x0 = y, xm = x and for each
k = 0, . . . ,m− 1,
xk+1>Sk x
k.
We call the sequence (x0, S0, x1, . . . , xm−1, Sm−1, xm) a dominance path, andm its length.
The main result of the article can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. For each game v ∈ Γ cN and each imputation x ∈ I(v) \ C(v), there exists a core element c ∈ C(v) and a dominance
path from x to c with length smaller than or equal to n(n− 1)/2.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a procedure which is presented in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4.
3. The procedure
From now on, we fix a game v ∈ Γ cN , an imputation x0 ∈ I(v) \ C(v) and an arbitrary core element c ∈ C(v). We
would like to construct a sequence of imputations (x0, . . . , xm, . . .) and a sequence of coalitions (S0, . . . , Sm, . . .)with three
properties. If Nk stands for the set of players who are assigned in xk a different payoff than in c , i.e.
Nk =

i ∈ N : xki ≠ ci

,
then the three properties can be described as follows:
• there is am ≤ n(n− 1)/2 such that xm ∈ C(v),
• for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, xk+1>Sk xk,• for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, Nk+1 ⊆ Nk.
The first two properties mean that the sequence (x0, S0, x1, . . . , xm−1, Sm−1, xm) is a dominance path terminating in the
core. The last property means that once a player i ∈ N gets ci, his payoff will remain unchanged in the subsequent steps,
i.e. xk+1N\Nk = cN\Nk for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. Before proceeding to the construction of the sequence of imputations
(x0, . . . , xm, . . .), we give, for each k ∈ N, the definition of coalition Sk assuming that xk has already been defined.We choose
Sk with two features: a coalition with the smallest number of players in Nk among the set of coalitions with positive excess
with respect to xk, and with the maximal excess among those coalitions. Formally, Sk ∈ E(xk), and for each T ∈ E(xk) \ {Sk},
either
|Sk ∩ Nk| < |T ∩ Nk|
or
|Sk ∩ Nk| = |T ∩ Nk| and e(xk, Sk) ≥ e(xk, T ). (1)
Here is a first difference between our procedure and the one in Sengupta and Sengupta [9] since they choose a coalitionwith
the maximal excess. Kóczy [5] also chooses a coalition with the maximal excess.
Clearly, Sk ∩ Nk ≠ ∅ otherwise xkSk = cSk implies xk(Sk) = c(Sk) ≥ v(Sk), a contradiction with the choice of Sk ∈ E(xk).
Furthermore, Nk \ Sk ≠ ∅, otherwise xkN\Sk = cN\Sk implies v(Sk) > xk(Sk) = xk(N) − xk(N \ Sk) = c(Sk), another
contradiction with c ∈ C(v). In addition, we define the coalition Tk of players in Sk who are assigned less in xk than
in c , i.e.
Tk =

i ∈ Sk : xki < ci

.
Without any loss of generality, the players in Tk are labeled i1, . . . , i|Tk| in such a way that ci1 − xki1 ≤ ci2 − xki2 ≤ · · · ≤
c|Tk| − xk|Tk|. In other words, we order the players in Tk according to the difference between their payoffs in c and in xk, from
the smallest to the largest. Note that Tk ≠ ∅ otherwise we would obtain xk(Sk) ≥ c(Sk) ≥ v(Sk), which is impossible since
Sk ∈ E(xk).
In order to construct xk+1 from xk, choose one of the players in Nk \ Sk, say player jk. In xk+1, we use the excess e(xk, Sk)
so as to rise xki up to ci for as many players i in Tk as possible. Any other player i ∈ Sk will keep his payoff xki . Lastly, each
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player i ∈ N \ Sk will receive ci except the chosen player jk who will get the remainder of v(N), which cannot be less
than cjk . Formally,
xk+1i =

ci if i = it ∈ Tk and
t
r=1

cir − xkir
 ≤ e(xk, Sk)
or i ∈ N \ ((Sk ∩ Nk) ∪ {jk}),
xki + e(xk, Sk)−
t−1
r=1

cir − xkir

if i = it ∈ Tk and
t−1
r=1

cir − xkir
 ≤ e(xk, Sk) < t
r=1

cir − xkir

,
xki if i = it ∈ Tk and
t−1
r=1

cir − xkir

> e(xk, Sk)
or i ∈ (Sk ∩ Nk) \ Tk,
ci + c(Sk)− v(Sk) if i = jk.
Here is a second difference with Sengupta and Sengupta [9]. In order to satisfy the coalition Sk, these authors split equally
the excess e(xk, Sk) among the players in Tk. By contrast, we order the players in Tk so as to give as many players in Tk the
difference between their current payoff in xk and their targeted core payoff in c.
By the fact that x0 ∈ I(v) and by construction, we clearly get xk+1 ∈ I(v) and xk+1(Sk) = v(Sk). The construction of
xk+1 also ensures xk+1>Sk x
k and Nk+1 ⊆ Nk. The proof of Theorem 1 consists in gradually reducing the sets Nk, k ∈ N. It is
therefore crucial to determine whether Nk+1 is a strict subset of Nk or not. To do so, all situations can be grasped by the four
following cases:
1. |Sk ∩ Nk| < |Nk| − 1,
2. |Sk ∩ Nk| = |Nk| − 1 and c(Sk) = v(Sk),
3. |Sk ∩ Nk| = |Nk| − 1, c(Sk) > v(Sk) and e(xk, Sk) ≥ ci1 − xki1 ,
4. |Sk ∩ Nk| = |Nk| − 1, c(Sk) > v(Sk) and e(xk, Sk) < ci1 − xki1 .
We will show in the next section that Nk+1 is a strict subset of Nk if one of the first three conditions holds, but that
Nk+1 = Nk if condition 4 holds. Before moving to the analysis of this procedure, let us illustrate by a simple example what
happens if condition 4 holds.
Example 1. Consider the game v on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}where the non-zero worths are given by:
S {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3,4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 18 18 18 8 24
This gamehas a nonempty core since c = (16, 2, 2, 4) ∈ C(v). Let us startwith imputation x0 = (0, 8, 8, 8) ∈ I(v)\C(v).
We get N0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E(x0) = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}, and the excess of each of these three coalitions is 2. Remark
that condition 4 holds for each coalition S ∈ E(x0). Let us choose S0 = {1, 2, 3} so that T0 = {1}. Thus player 1 will receive
the whole excess of S0 and player 4 will bear the loss since he is the unique player outside S0. We get x1 = (2, 8, 8, 6). At
this step, we have N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and E(x1) = {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}, with each excess equal to 2. It is easy to check that
condition 4 still holds. Pick S1 = {1, 2, 4} so that T1 = {1}. Once again player 1 is the unique player to benefit from the
excess of S1 while player 3 is the unique player to incur a loss since {3} = N \ S1. We obtain x2 = (4, 8, 6, 6). At this step,
each player’s payoff is still different from the target c so that N2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. We have E(x2) = {{1, 3, 4}} and condition 4
is still satisfied. We must pick S2 = {1, 3, 4}, which means T2 = {1}. We get x3 = (6, 6, 6, 6) ∈ C(v).
This example highlights that condition 4makes it impossible to reduce in one step the number of players with a different
payoff that in c . We will prove in the next section that if condition 4 holds at a step k, then after at most |Nk|−1 steps either
the number |Nk| of players with a different payoff than in c has decreased or the core is reached by the procedure (as in this
example). This last remark points out that the core can be reached without completing the transformation of x0 into c.
As a final illustration of the necessity to rely on a core element, let us replace c = (16, 2, 2, 4) by the imputation
y = (8, 8, 8, 0) which is not in the core since for instance y({1, 2, 4}) = 16 < v({1, 2, 4)} = 18. Let us start
with x0 = (8, 7, 6, 3) ∈ I(v) \ C(v). Based on y, it is easy to check that our procedure constructs the sequence
(x0, S0, x1, . . . , xk−1, Sk−1, xk, . . .) such that xk = (8, 7, 6, 3), Sk = {1, 3, 4} and Tk = {3} if k is even, and xk = (8, 6, 7, 3),
Sk = {1, 2, 4} and Tk = {2} if k is odd. In other words, the procedure never terminates. 
4. Analysis
The analysis of our procedure relies on two Lemmas. Lemma 1 shows that if Nk cannot be reduced from step k to step
k + 1, then the procedure does not create any new coalition S with positive excess and such that |S ∩ Nk| = |Nk| − 1 at
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step k+ 1. Since in addition Sk is removed from the set of such coalitions, this means that the set of coalition S with positive
excess and such that |S ∩Nk| = |Nk| − 1 is reduced from step k to step k+ 1. Lemma 2 will use this fact to provide an upper
bound on the number of steps necessary to reduce set Nk.
Lemma 1. If either condition 1, 2 or 3 holds, then Nk+1 ⊂ Nk. If condition 4 holds, then Nk+1 = Nk and
S ∈ E(xk+1) : |S ∩ Nk+1| = |Nk+1| − 1
 ⊆ S ∈ E(xk) : |S ∩ Nk| = |Nk| − 1, S ∩ Nk ≠ Sk ∩ Nk .
Proof. The first part of the statement follows directly from the definition of xk+1. Using the notations introduced to describe
our procedure, we indeed have i ∈ Nk \ Nk+1 for each player i in the nonempty set Nk \ (Sk ∪ {jk}) if condition 1 holds,
jk ∈ Nk \ Nk+1 if condition 2 holds and i1 ∈ Nk \ Nk+1 if condition 3 holds.
For the second part, note that condition 4 implies that Nk+1 = Nk, Nk \ Sk = {jk}, xk+1i1 = xki1 + e(xk, Sk), xk+1jk + xk+1i1 =
xkjk + xki1 , and xk+1i = xki for each i ∈ N \ {i1, jk}. Choose any S ∈ E(xk+1) such that |S ∩ Nk+1| = |Nk+1| − 1. Denote by
j the unique player in Nk+1 \ S. We consider three cases depending on the identity of j. First, suppose that j = jk. Then,
xk+1(S) = xk(S)+ e(xk, S) and S ∩ Nk = Sk ∩ Nk. We get the contradiction
0 < v(S)− xk+1(S) = v(S)− xk(S)− e(xk, Sk) = e(xk, S)− e(xk, Sk) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality is due to (1), i.e. e(xk, Sk) ≥ e(xk, T ) for each T ∈ E(xk) such that |Sk ∩ Nk| = |T ∩ Nk|. So jk ∈ S,
which implies Sk ∉ E(xk+1). Second, suppose j = i1. Since xkjk − xk+1jk = e(xk, Sk), we get
e(xk+1, S) = e(xk, S)+ xkjk − xk+1jk = e(xk, S)+ e(xk, Sk) > e(xk, S) > 0,
whichmeans S ∈ E(xk). Third, suppose that j ∈ Nk\{i1, jk}. The equality xk+1jk +xk+1i1 = xkjk+xki1 yields e(xk, S) = e(xk+1, S) >
0, which implies once again S ∈ E(xk). 
Lemma 2. For any k ∈ N, at least one of the following cases holds:
• there exists q ∈ {1, . . . , |Nk| − 1} such that xk+q ∈ C(v),• |Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk| − 1.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that none of the two cases holds. In particular, |Nk+|Nk|−1| = |Nk| since for each
q ∈ {1, . . . , |Nk| − 1}, we have Nk+q ⊆ Nk+q−1 by construction of xk+q. We have seen that, when either condition 1, 2 or 3 is
satisfied, |Nk+1| ≤ |Nk|−1,whichmeans that |Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk|−1. So itmust be the case that condition 4 holds for anyNk+q,
q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk|−2}. In particular, for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk|−2} and each S ∈ E(xk+q), it holds that |S∩Nk+q| = |Nk+q|−1.
Now, let pkq denote the number of coalitions S in E(x
k+q) such that |S ∩ Nk+q| = |Nk+q| − 1, q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 1}. On the
one hand, there exists an agent i ∈ Nk such that xki < ci since Tk ≠ ∅. As a consequence, we get for any such agent i,
v(Nk \ {i}) ≤ c(Nk \ {i}) = c(Nk)− ci = xk(Nk)− ci ≤ xk(Nk)− xki = xk(Nk \ {i}).
Hence e(xk,Nk \ {i}) ≤ 0 for at least one i ∈ Nk, which implies pk0 ≤ |Nk| − 1. On the other hand, Lemma 1 proves that
pkq > p
k
q+1 for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}. Thus, we have |Nk| − 1 ≥ pk0 > pk1 > · · · > pk|Nk|−2 ≥ 1, which enforces that
pkq = |Nk| − 1− q for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}. In particular, it holds that pk0 = |Nk| − 1, which in turn implies that there
exists a unique player in Nk, denoted by i for the rest of the proof, such that xki < ci. Thus, for any agent j ∈ Nk \ {i}, we have
xkj ≥ cj, which yields xk+qj ≥ cj for each integer q ≥ 0 by construction.
Next consider the set E(xk+|Nk|−1). Since pk|Nk|−2 = 1, Lemma1yields that E(xk+|Nk|−1)does not contain any coalition S such
that |S∩Nk+|Nk|−1| = |Nk|−1. So any nonempty coalition S ∈ E(xk+|Nk|−1) thatwe can pick satisfies |S∩Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk|−2.
There are two possibilities. First, if the above-mentioned player i is not in S, then for each player j ∈ S, xk+|Nk|−1j ≥ cj, and thus
xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥ c(S) ≥ v(S). Second, suppose that i ∈ S. Recall that condition 4 holds at each step k+q, q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk|−2}.
In particular, |Sk+|Nk|−2 ∩ Nk+|Nk|−2| = |Nk| − 1 and jk+|Nk|−2 is the unique player in Nk \ Sk+|Nk|−2. Recall also that the
satisfaction of coalition Sk+|Nk|−2 implies the equality x
k+|Nk|−1
i − xk+|Nk|−2i = xk+|Nk|−2jk+|Nk |−2 − x
k+|Nk|−1
jk+|Nk |−2
since player i is the unique
player such that xk+|Nk|−2i < ci at step k + |Nk| − 2. From this equality, we obtain xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥ xk+|Nk|−2(S). In addition,
since |S ∩ Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk| − 2, condition 4 yields S ∉ E(xk+|Nk|−2), so that we also obtain xk+|Nk|−2(S) ≥ v(S). Therefore,
we get xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥ v(S). We conclude that E(xk+|Nk|−1) = ∅ or equivalently that xk+|Nk|−1 ∈ C(v), a contradiction with
the initial assumption. 
We now have the material required to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By way of contradiction, assume that, for each m ≤ n(n − 1)/2, we have xm ∉ C(v). For each
k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, define the integer σ(k) = kq=1(n − q). Hence σ(0) = 0 and σ(n) = n(n − 1)/2. We prove by induction
that, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, it holds that |Nσ(k)| ≤ n− k.
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Initial step: The inequality |Nσ(0)| = |N0| ≤ n follows directly from the definition of N0.
Induction hypothesis: pick any k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and assume that |Nσ(q)| ≤ n− q for each integer q ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Induction step: Let us show that Nσ(k+1) ≤ n − k − 1. Recall that σ(k) < n(n − 1)/2 so that xσ(k) ∉ C(v) by assumption.
Together with Lemma 2, this implies that
|Nσ(k)+|Nσ(k)|−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)| − 1. (2)
By the induction hypothesis, |Nσ(k)| ≤ n− k, so that both sides of (2) can be bounded as follows:
|Nσ(k)+n−k−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)+|Nσ(k)|−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)| − 1 ≤ n− k− 1.
Since σ(k)+n− k−1 is precisely σ(k+1), we conclude that |Nσ(k+1)| ≤ n− k−1 as desired. In particular, |Nσ(n)| ≤ n−n,
which means that Nn(n−1)/2 is the empty set. In other words xn(n−1)/2 = c , which contradicts the initial assumption that
xn(n−1)/2 ∉ C(v). 
5. Reduced-games equivalences
This section establishes connections between the cores of Davis–Maschler reduced-games and of the original game. By
the way we suggest an alternative approach to prove Theorem 1. Let S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N} be any nonempty coalition different
from N and x ∈ I(v) any imputation. The reduced-game with respect to S and x proposed by Davis and Maschler [2] is the
game vS,x on S defined as
vS,x(T ) =

0 if T = ∅,
v(N)− x(N \ S) if T = S,
max
R∈2N\S
(v(T ∪ R)− x(R)) if T ∈ 2S \ {∅, S}.
In this section the direct dominance relation and the excess function will be used in the Davis–Maschler reduced-games
as well without any risk of confusion.
Let Γ be the set of all games with player set included in N . A solution F on Γ satisfies the reduced-game property if for
each v ∈ Γ , each S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N} and each x ∈ F(v), it holds that xS ∈ F(vS,x). It is well-known that the core satisfies the
reduced-game property. Indeed, the reduced-game property is one of the axioms used by Peleg [8] in order to characterize
the core.
For games with a nonempty core, it is useful to construct Davis–Maschler reduced-games with respect to core elements
only. This section establishes two interesting properties of such reduced-games. To begin with, we formulate some
remarks. So fix any v ∈ Γ with a nonempty core, any S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N} and any c ∈ C(v). First, c ∈ C(v) implies
e(c, R) ≤ 0 for each R ∈ 2N\S , which in turn leads to vS,c(∅) = 0 by choosing R = ∅. Second, on the one
hand, it holds that maxR∈2N\S (v(S ∪ R)− c(R)) ≥ v(S ∪ (N \ S)) − c(N \ S) = c(S). On the other hand, we have
maxR∈2N\S (v(S ∪ R)− c(R)) ≤ maxR∈2N\S (c(S ∪ R)− c(R)) = c(S). Thus, we get maxR∈2N\S (v(S ∪ R)− c(R)) = c(S). As
a consequence, the Davis–Maschler reduced-game vS,c can be reformulated by the following simpler expression: for each
T ∈ 2S ,
vS,c(T ) = max
R∈2N\S
(v(T ∪ R)− c(R)) .
For simplicity, for each T ∈ 2S , we denote by T a coalition in 2N\S such that
vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪ T )− c(T ).
Proposition 1. Consider any v ∈ Γ with a nonempty core, any S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N} and any c ∈ C(v). Pick any x ∈ I(v) such that
xN\S = cN\S . Then, x ∈ C(v) if and only if xS ∈ C(vS,c).
Proof. First, suppose that x ∈ C(v). Choose any coalition T ∈ 2S . Since x ∈ C(v), we have v(T ∪ T ) ≤ x(T ∪ T ). Therefore,
by definition of vS,c , we obtain vS,c(T ) ≤ x(T ∪ T ) − c(T ) = xS(T ) since xT = cT . Regarding efficiency of xS in vS,c , it turns
out that
xS(S) = x(N)− x(N \ S) = c(N)− c(N \ S) = c(S) = vS,c(S).
Second, suppose that xS ∈ C(vS,c). Since xN\S = cN\S and xS(S) = vS,c(S) = c(S), we get x(N) = c(N) = v(N), proving
that x is an efficient allocation in v. Next, choose any coalition T ∈ 2N . The definition of vS,c and xS ∈ C(vS,c) imply that
v(T ) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T \ S))
= v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T \ S))− c(T \ S)+ c(T \ S)
≤ vS,c(T ∩ S)+ c(T \ S)
≤ xS(T ∩ S)+ c(T \ S)
= x(T ),
which proves the result. 
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Note that the proof of the first implication does not follow from the reduced-game property since the imputation x
that is proved to be in the core can be different from the core element c from which the Davis–Maschler reduced-game is
constructed.
Proposition 2. Consider any v ∈ Γ with a nonempty core, any S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N} and any c ∈ C(v). Pick any two imputations
x, y ∈ I(v) such that xN\S = yN\S = cN\S and a coalition T ⊂ S. Then x>T∪T y in v if and only if xS >T yS in vS,c .
Proof. First, assume that x>T∪T y in v. Then we have xT∪T > yT∪T . In addition, T ∈ 2N\S implies xT = yT . It follows
that xT > yT . Next, x>T∪T y in v also means that x(T ∪ T ) ≤ v(T ∪ T ). Therefore, by definition of x, we get vS,c(T ) =
v(T ∪ T )− c(T ) ≥ x(T ∪ T )− c(T ) = x(T ). We conclude that xS >T yS in vS,c .
Second, assume that xS >T yS in vS,c . Then xT > yT . Since xT = yT by assumption, this implies that xT∪T > yT∪T . Moreover,
xS >T yS in vS,c also means that x(T ) ≤ vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪ T ) − c(T ). Thus, v(T ∪ T ) ≥ x(T ) + c(T ) = x(T ∪ T ). Therefore
x>T∪T y in v. 
The game ‘‘reduction’’ is a transitive operation in the sense that for each k ≥ 1, the game vNk,c is also the Davis–Maschler
reduced-game of vNk−1,c with respect to Nk and c . Thus, the Davis–Maschler reduced-games can be used to reformulate the
proof of Theorem 1. In fact, at each step k of our procedure, xk ∉ C(v) is equivalent to xkNk ∉ C(vNk,c) by Proposition 1
since xkN\Nk = cN\Nk . This means that at step k we can restrict our attention to the reduced-game with respect to Nk and c
and to the associated set of coalitions with positive excess. The Davis–Maschler reduced-game vNk,c somehow preserves the
dominance relation of v so that Proposition 2 tells us that Sk can be chosen as a subset ofNk regardless of the complementary
coalition N \Nk in the original game v. Proceeding in this fashion until the core is reached at some stepm ≤ n(n− 1)/2, we
could construct a sequence of imputations (x0, . . . , xm), a sequence of coalitions (S0, . . . , Sm−1) and a sequence of games
((N0, vN0,c), . . . , (Nm, vNm,c)) such that the sequence (x
0, S0 ∪ S0, x1, S1 ∪ S1, . . . , xm−1, Sm−1 ∪ Sm−1, xm) is a dominance
path of lengthm between x0 and xm in the original game v. Finally, Lemma 2 proves that at step k at most |Nk| − 1 steps are
necessary to construct a new Davis–Maschler reduced-game with fewer players.
6. A comparison with the alternative procedures
In this section,we compare our procedurewith two other approaches: Yang’s [11] approach since he is the first to provide
an explicit bound on the accessibility of the core, and Manea’s [6] since his procedure is very simple to outline.
A first example shows that the tâtonnement procedure adopted by Manea [6] may not reach the core and that the
allocations created along the procedure may not be imputations. The tâtonnement procedure of Manea [6] consists, at each
step k, in choosing one of the coalitions with the greatest excess with respect to the current allocation xk, say Sk. Then the
excess of Sk is split equally among its members, while the loss is shared equally among the other players, i.e.
xk+1i =

xki + e(xk, Sk)/|Sk| if i ∈ Sk,
xki − e(xk, Sk)/|N \ Sk| if i ∈ N \ Sk.
Example 2. Consider the game v on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}where the non-zero worths are given by:
S {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 10 10 10 8 8 8 12
Imputation c = (9, 1, 1, 1) proves that C(v) ≠ ∅. Let imputation x0 = (0, 0, 0, 12) ∈ I(v) \ C(v) be our departure
point. The largest excess of 10 with respect to x0 is borne by coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3}. Without loss of generality, choose
S0 = {1, 2}. Then the constructed allocation x1 = (5, 5,−5, 7) at step 1 is not an imputation. Continuing in this fashion, it
can be checked that the sequence of allocations (x1, x2, . . .)will never reach the core since at any step of the tâtonnement,
coalition {1, 2} or {1, 3} or {2, 3, 4}will have positive excess. 
A second example illustrates that our bound considerably improves the best bound found so far. Consider a game v on
N = {1, . . . , n} such that v({i}) = 0 for each i ∈ N , v(N) = n and v(S) = 1 otherwise. For any n ∈ N, the allocation c
such that ci = 1 for each i ∈ N belongs to the core. In addition, the game has the maximal number 2n − (n + 2) of active
coalitions, which is the bound found by Yang [11]. For n sufficiently large, the difference between this bound and ours is
considerable. For instance, if n = 20, then Yang [11] obtains 1,048,554 while our bound shrinks to 190. According to Yang,
the bound found by Kóczy [5] is even greater. It can be argued that the bound of Yang is well-suited for games with a large
number of players but few active coalitions. However, one can note that even games with a very simple structure can have
a large number of active coalitions. For instance, consider a unanimity game uS on N with respect to coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅},
i.e. uS(T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. The number of active coalitions in uS is 2n−|S|− 1 if |S| ≥ 2 and 0 if |S| = 1.
Therefore, the bound of Yang is greater than ours whenever
2 ≤ |S| ≤ n+ 1− log2(n+ 1)− log2(n− 2).
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If n = 20, the above condition is met for each unanimity game uS such that 2 ≤ |S| ≤ 13. There are other classes of games
with nonempty cores which contain a large number of active coalitions, such as strictly superadditive games and strictly
convex games. Another similar class of games is the class of queueing games studied by Maniquet [7]. In such games, only
coalitions of size two have a non-zero dividend, which implies that all coalitions of size at least two are active. One last class
of games with a large number of active coalitions is the class of market games introduced by Shapley [10]. For any game in
this class, any coalition containing at least one buyer and one seller has a worth of at least a unit, which is greater than the
zero worth obtained from summing the stand-alone worths of the members of the coalition.
7. Conclusion
The new upper bound on the number of blocks required to access the core provided in this article considerably improves
the former existing bounds. We did not manage to prove the same result with the procedure of Sengupta and Sengupta [9].
Therefore, we suspect that the two differences between their procedure and ours are crucial in order to establish the result.
Moreover, we conjecture that this bound can be lowered. In fact, we did not succeed in finding examples where our bound
is tight, which might suggest that it is very unlikely that the ‘‘worst-case’’ scenarios considered throughout the proofs occur
simultaneously. We therefore wonder whether our polynomial number of blocks can be sufficiently reduced to become
linear while preserving Harsanyi’s [4] dominance relation. This question is left for future works.
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